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Abstract. Near field communication (NFC) is a Radio Frequency (RF)
technology that allows data to be exchanged between devices that are in
close proximity. We formally analyse a hash based NFC mobile coupon
protocol using formal methods (Casper/FDR2 ). We discover a few pos-
sible attacks which break the requirements of the protocol. We propose
solutions to address these attacks based on two different threat models.
In addition, this paper is a facilitating case study for a black-box user to
become a more powerful analyser.
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1 Introduction
Near Field Communication (NFC) [1] is a radio frequency (RF) communication
link, which allows data to be exchanged between devices that are normally less
than 10 cm apart [2]. NFC-based mobiles are an emerging technology chang-
ing the way we communicate with objects. For instance, payments, tickets and
coupons can be exchanged just by waving the NFC-based mobile at the points
of sale.
NFC security is an important issue that has been emphasised in the litera-
ture [3, 4]. Even though NFC has the advantage of a short communication link,
security measures must be considered especially with sensitive applications to
address security requirements, such as confidentiality, integrity and availability.
The NFC mobile coupon application (M-coupon) is one of the promising
and popular applications [5–8]. An M-coupon is a cryptographically secured
electronic message with some value. It requires secure issuing and cashing of the
M-coupons, otherwise it can cause huge losses for a company and damage its
reputation [9].
The NFC M-coupon system has a typical scenario, see Figure 1. All parties
have NFC capability, in order to communicate with each other. Firstly, a user
scans his NFC mobile against an NFC issuer (e.g., a smart poster or newspaper).
Then, an M-coupon is issued and sent to his mobile. Later, the user goes to the
shop to cash the M-coupon with the cashier. The cashier may authenticate the
user before the cashier provides the promised bonus. Only the cashier needs to
have online access, whereas the issuer and the user can both be oﬄine. Hsiang
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et al. [10] have proposed a secure hash-based M-coupon protocol which allows
secure issuing and cashing of M-coupons. They designed the protocol to address
specific M-coupon requirements.
On the other hand, designing a security protocol is a difficult task even with
strong encryption methods. Many attacks may be possible on the cryptographic
protocols just by intercepting and replaying encrypted messages between enti-
ties, without decrypting any messages. Formal security analysis is a powerful
approach to check the security of a protocol and whether it address its require-
ments [11].
In this paper we use the CasperFDR approach [12] based on Communicating
Sequential Processes (CSP) [13], a formal method (state exploration) approach,
to formally analyse the NFC M-coupon protocol proposed by Hsiang et al [10].
Our analysis found attacks against the protocol. We then provide three solutions
to address these vulnerabilities. We formally verify with CasperFDR that the
flaw is addressed. In fact, this paper also provides a case study for a black-box
user who wish to become more powerful in protocol analysis by CasperFDR.
2 The Casper Approach
In our analysis we use CSP [13], with its model checker Failures Divergence
Refinement (FDR2), which is proven to be an effective method in analysing the
security of protocols [14]. However, modelling protocols in CSP is not a trivial
task. Gavin Lowe developed CasperFDR [12], a tool that allows the user to write
an abstract description of a security protocol, then the tool produces codes in
CSP language, and directly checks it with FDR2. CasperFDR has been used to
analyse a huge number of protocols [15], which proves its capability of finding
vulnerabilities, making it a robust CSP model producer.
CasperFDR is a formal method tool which supports symbolic protocol anal-
ysis in the Dolev-Yao model [16] which assumes no encrypted message can be
decrypted without the decryption key, thus the CasperFDR intruder model does
not perform any cryptanalysis. However, the intruder does have full control of
the network traffic, and tries to break the security protocol from what has been
learned.
The way attacks are found by a refinement checking of protocol’s properties.
When refinement fails, then it provides a trace which show how the property
fails, that correspond to an attack.
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(a) Simple protocol
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(b) Simple protocol attack
Fig. 2. Illustrating example
2.1 Simple example
Figure 2a is our demonstrating simple protocol. A two message protocol aims to
authenticate Bob to Alice:
1. Alice → Bob : {A, NA, KAB}PKB
2. Bob → Alice : {NA}KAB
Message 1 sent by Alice to Bob containing Alice identity, Nonce (number used
once) and a session key KAB, encrypted with Bob’s public key. Then, Bob send
message 2 by encrypting the Nonce (NA) with the session key. Alice authenticates
Bob based on the fact that since message 1 is encrypted by Bob’s public key,
he is the only one can extract the session key and the nonce and send message
2. At the end of the protocol both Alice and Bob believe the session key KAB is
secret .
4Analysing this protocol in CasperFDR is a quite straightforward procedure.
Having modelled the exchanged messages between entities, we check the claimed
authentication and secrecy using the following claims:
Agreement(Bob,Alice,[NA])
StrongSecret(Bob, KAB,[Alice])
The Agreement specification means it will check whether Bob is authenticated
to Alice and have both of them agreed on the Nonce NA. The StrongSecret
specification is checking whether the key KAB is secret between Bob and Alice.
CasperFDR will complete the remaining process for us as we explained earlier.
Nevertheless, understanding how these specifications are captured under-
neath CasperFDR is important if we want precise descriptions of how claimed
properties are modelled in a specific application, as we will see later.
Capturing authentication between Alice and Bob in the protocol is done
by utilising new events injected in the protocol as demonstrated in Figure 2a.
These events are Running and Commit. Initially, Alice and Bob are modelled as
independent CSP processes. After message 1, Bob performs the Running event,
which means Bob starts running the protocol apparently with Alice. Then, Alice
will perform the Commit event at the end of her part of the protocol, which
means Alice has finished a run of the protocol with Bob. Alice could make sure
she was running the protocol with Bob based on the fact that if Alice reaches the
Commit event then Bob must have reached the Running event before. Launching
an attack relies on the possibility of the intruder, without taking Bob’s role, to
engineer a trace of the protocol in which Alice runs the Commit event without
a corresponding Running event from Bob.
For secrecy, only the Claim Secret event is used by Alice and Bob. Figure 2a
only shows when Bob performs Claim Secret event. An attack is launched if the
intruder could break this claim, by finding a trace of the protocol in which the
intruder knows a claimed secret, without taking Alice’s or Bob’s roles.
The Running, Commit and Claim Secret events can also contain more infor-
mation specific to the agreement required between the participants. They are
constructed by:
Agent.Agent.Message
For example Running.Bob.Alice.NA, which means Bob starts a run of the
protocol, apparently with Alice, using nonce NA.
The Casper analysis finds no attack on authentication, but there is an attack
on secrecy. Figure 2b illustrates how an intruder can creak a session key that
Bob believes is secret with Alice. Anyone can generate message 1 since Bob’s
public key is publicly known. The intruder impersonates Alice by including Alice
identity, making Bob believe the session key KMB is secret with Alice.
2.2 Hierarchy of Authentication and secrecy
CasperFDR provides different flavours of testing authentication and secrecy.
The strongest form of authentication specification is Agreement. If Alice and
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completed a run of the protocol with Alice, then Alice has previously been
running the protocol, agreeing on their roles in the protocol, and there is a one-
to-one relationship between Alice and Bob i.e. each run of Alice corresponds to
a unique run of Bob.
A weaker authentication specification is NonInjectiveAgreement. The differ-
ence from Agreement is that the one-to-one relationship is not required. Each
run of one participant matches a run of the other but they can overlap. For
example, two ”Commit” events may correspond to the same ”Running” event.
Secrecy has two forms of specification, Secret and StrongSecret. Secret is
testing if the intruder could know the secret value at the end of the protocol.
StrongSecret is stronger than Secret that it even checks whether the intruder is
able to know the secret value without completing a full run of the protocol.
2.3 Channels
CasperFDR allows adjusting the intruder’s ability on any messages of the pro-
tocol. For example:
#Channels
1 NF NRA- NR
2 C NF NRA NR
The first line means that on message 1 the intruder neither can fake data NF
, nor honest reascribing NRA- (changing the sender ID except to his own ID)
nor redirecting NR (changing the receiver ID). The second line means that on
message 2 the intruder neither can eavesdrop C, nor fake data, nor reascribing
nor redirecting.
By adjusting some of protocol’s channels, we can capture assumptions made
in the protocol as we will see later.
3 Protocol Security Requirements
The analysed protocol we consider in this paper intends to address six security
requirements, as stated by the protocol designer in [10]:
– Confidentiality: A third party shall not be able to obtain the M-coupon
by eavesdropping.
– Data Integrity: An attacker shall not be able to modify data during the
communication.
– Forgery Protection:
• No Unauthorized Generation: An attacker shall not be able to issue
his own M-coupon.
• No Manipulation: M-coupon shall not stay valid after a manipulation.
– Unauthorized Copying: An attacker shall not be able to produce a valid
copy of an M-coupon and cash it in. This requirement can be divided into:
6• Not Transferable: Whatever identity is presented at issuing phase shall
not be changed during the protocol.
• User Authentication: in addition to Not transferable, the identity of
the user is the one who it claim to be. The user who issued the M-coupon
must be the one who is cashing it at the cashier. This requires the cashier
to authenticates the user through some authentication methods.
This protocol only addresses the Not transferable requirement.
– No Multiple Cash-in: An attacker shall not be able to use the same M-
coupon multiple times.
3.1 Formal definition
Figure 3 illustrates a formal definition of these requirements which are required
for series of protocols, and the relationship between them.
Confidentiality requires that data representing the M-coupon in the protocol
must satisfy StrongSecret specification between the issuer and the cashier.
NonInjectiveAgreement specification includes three requirements, and layers,
of authentications between the cashier and the issuer. We are not concern here
with repeats because it is checked by other requirement and it may be not re-
quired in some systems. Forgery protection, after identifying data representing
the M-coupon, a NonInjectiveAgreement on the M-coupon between the issuer
and the cashier is required. This is violated if the cashier accepts the M-coupon
that have not been issued by the issuer. This implies either that the M-coupon
have been created by an attacker (i.e. Unauthorised Generation) or else that the
M-coupon generated by the issuer has been modified to another (i.e. No Ma-
nipulation ). Not Transferable is a stronger specification than forgery protection
that it also requires an agreement on a user identity attached to the M-coupon.
The strongest NonInjectiveAgreement specification is Data Integrity, both the
cashier and the issuer must agree on the integrity of all data in the protocol.
No Multiple Cash-in requires an Agreement specification between the issuer
and the cashier. Every time the cashier accepts M-coupon, there must be a
separate occasion where the issuer must have issued them. Hence cashier cannot
accept M-coupon more times than issuer sent them.
User Authentication is an Agreement between the user and the cashier on
some credential. Even though the M-coupon might be used many times, user
must be authenticated in each time.
4 Protocol Description
The M-coupon protocol of [10] uses simple hash functions, which is a computa-
tionally light cryptographic method, a suitable choice with standard RFID/NFC
tags. The notation in the protocol description is as follows:
7Cashier       Issuer
Forgery Protection
NonInjectiveAgreement 
(Issuer,Cashier,[M-coupon])
Not Transferable
NonInjectiveAgreement 
(Issuer,Cashier,[M-coupon , User ID])
Data Integrity
NonInjectiveAgreement
(Issuer,Cashier,[ALL DATA])
Confidentiality
StrongSecret
(Cashier, SECRET, [Issuer])
No Multiple Cash-in
Agreement 
(Issuer,Cashier,[M-coupon])
User Authentication
Agreement 
(User,Cashier,[CREDENTIAL])
Cashier       Issuer
Fig. 3. Hierarchy of authentication/secrecy properties
ID(i) Issuer ID
ID(u) User ID
Offer The promised Offer with required data
X A secret key between the issuer and the cashier
⊕ Exclusive or (XOR)
h[..] Hash function
There are four messages in this protocol:
1. U → I : ID(u)
2. I → U : M = {ID(u) , V , C}
3. U → C : M = {ID(u) , V , C}
4. C → U : BONUS
Initially, the cashier C and the issuer I share a secret value, X and an offer.
The cashier stores a table consisting of hashes of all issuers identities, h[ID(i)].
At the issuing phase, the user’s mobile U sends his identity to the issuer
(message 1). Then, the issuer produces a coupon, M (message 2), consisting of
three parts: ID(u), V and C.
V = ID(u)⊕ h[ID(i)]
C = h[h[ID(i)]⊕X ⊕Offer]
At the cashing phase, the user’s mobile sends the M-coupon to the cashier
(message 3). Then, the cashier obtains h[ID(i)] by computing ID(u)⊕ V . The
cashier can look up ID(i) from the hash, and then find X and Offer. When
8the cashier has ID(u) and Offer, it can decide if the M-coupon has been used
before, and reject it accordingly. Then, the cashier will check the validity of the
M-coupon by computing h[h[ID(i)]⊕X⊕ Offer ] and confirm it matches C. The
cashier stores ID(u) to prevent re-use of the coupon, and sends the Bonus to
the user.
The intention is that the Confidentiality and Data Integrity requirements are
ensured by use of the secret value X. By including the identity of the user’s mo-
bile and offer, Multiple Cash-in and Not Transferable can be managed. Forgery
Protection is addressed by the secret value X which is known only by the cashier
and the issuer.
5 Modelling
In order to capture the NFC M-coupon requirements in the protocol, we develop
two main models shown in Figure 4. The main model Figure 4a captures four
requirements: Confidentiality, Forgery Protection, Not Transferable and Data
Integrity. The second model illustrated in Figure 4b captures the No Multiple
Cash-in requirement. Moreover, data representing the M-coupon in the protocol
are X and Offer.
5.1 The protocol’s requirements
We show in the following sections what we have to write in CasperFDR to model
the protocol’s requirements of section 3, then how it is captured underneath in
terms of Running, Commit and Claim Secret events. This enabling us to have
formal and precise descriptions of capturing NFC mobile coupon requirements.
Confidentiality We model confidentiality in Casper as follows:
StrongSecret(C, X , [I])
StrongSecret(C, Offer , [I])
These secrecy specifications means the cashier C claims that X and Offer are
confidential between the cashier C and the issuer I. StrongSecret checks whether
the intruder is able to break these claims without completing the protocol.
Figure 4a illustrates the first specification, secrecy of X . When the cashier
C performs the Claim Secret.C.I.X event, it can expect X to be a secret with
the issuer I who shares the secret key X. If this is violated then the intruder can
complete a run of the protocol with the cashier without taking the issuer role
in the protocol, and learn the secret key X. A similar description for the Offer
specification.
Forgery Protection We model forgery protection in Casper as follows:
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer])
9We identify the M-coupon with X and Offer. This states that If cashier
accepts X and Offer, then the issuer must have issued them. NonInjective means
that it is not concerned with repeats. I.e. the cashier can accept many times what
was issued once. This is violated if the cashier accepts X and Offer that have
not been issued by the issuer. This implies either that X and Offer have been
created by an attacker (i.e. Unauthorised Generation) or else that an M-coupon
generated by the issuer has been modified to another (i.e. No Manipulation ).
Hence if this property holds then we have Forgery Protection: No Unauthorised
Generation and No Manipulation.
This is illustrated in Figure 4a. After the issuer completes its part of the
protocol, it performs the Running.I.C.X.Offer event, which means the issuer I
starts a running of the protocol, apparently, with the cashier C, agreeing on
X and offer. Later, the cashier will perform the Commit.C.I.X.Offer event at
the end of its part of the protocol, which means the cashier C has finished the
protocol with the issuer I, agreeing on the X and Offer.
Unauthorized Copying (Not Transferable) We model Not Transferable in
Casper as follows:
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer,ID(u)])
This specification is similar to forgery protection specification, but also with
an agreement on a user identity. The coupon, [X, Offer ], must be attached to
one user only ID(u). Both the issuer and the cashier agree on the user to use
the coupon as many times as he like, as long as the coupon has been issued by
a genuine issuer, and is being used by the intended user. An example for such
coupon is frequent flyer coupon.
This is shown in Figure 4a. After the issuer completes its part of the protocol,
it performs the Running.I.C.X.Offer.ID(u) event, which means the issuer I starts
a running of the protocol, apparently, with the cashier C, agreeing on X, Offer
and ID(u). Later, the cashier will perform the Commit.C.I.X.Offer.ID(u) event
at the end of its part of the protocol, which means the cashier C has finished
the protocol with the issuer I, agreeing on the X, Offer and ID(u).
Observe that this property is stronger than forgery protection. If it holds
then not only the m-coupon must be genuine, as for forgery protection, but it
must also have the same user.
Data Integrity We model Data Integrity in Casper as follows:
NonInjectiveAgreement(I,C,[X,Offer,ID(u),ID(i)])
This will check the integrity of the protocol. Both the cashier and the issuer
must agree on all the information in the protocol.
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User's Mobile Cashier
1
2
Issuer
Commit.C.I.X.Offer.ID(u)
Commit.C.I.X.Offer
Claim_Secret.C.I.X
Commit.C.I.X.Offer.ID(u).ID(i)
Running.I.C.X.Offer.ID(u)
Running.I.C.X.Offer
Running.I.C.X.Offer.ID(u).ID(i)
ID(u)
M = {ID(u), V, C}
BONUS
M = {ID(u), V, C}
V = ID(u) ⊕ h[ID(i)] 
C = h[ h[ID(i)] ⊕ X ⊕ Offer ]    
3
4
(a) Main model: Confidentiality, Forgery Pro-
tection, Not Transferable and Data Integrity
User's Mobile Cashier
1
2
Issuer
Commit.C.I.X.Offer
Running.I.C.X.Offer
ID(u)
M = {ID(u), V, C}
BONUS
M = {ID(u), V, C}
V = ID(u) ⊕ h[ID(i)] 
C = h[ h[ID(i)] ⊕ X ⊕ Offer ]    
3
4
Mallory
3' M = {ID(u), V, C}
Commit.C.I.X.Offer
(b) No Multiple Cash-in model
Fig. 4. Capturing NFC M-coupon requirements
No Multiple Cash-in We model No Multiple Cash-in in Casper:
Agreement(I,C,[X,Offer])
This specification states that every time the cashier accepts X and Offer,
there must be a separate occasion where the issuer must have issued them.
Hence cashier cannot accept X and Offer more times than issuer sent them.
Figure 4b illustrates a scenario where the cashier is engaging in the protocol
twice, with one issuer run. The first time the cashier runs the protocol with
the user’s mobile, and the second, illegal, time with Mallory who might be an
intruder or the user himself. The second Commit should not occur if there was
not a separate Running.
5.2 Intruder knowledge
The analysis also requires us to define the initial knowledge of the intruder. The
intruder knows the following: the identities of himself, the user and the cashier,
and the hash function.
5.3 Assumptions
There is an assumptions made by the protocol’s designers that the client’s ID is
bounded to the client’s mobile device, and therefore the client is authenticated at
issuing and cashing phases. Therefore, we analyse this protocol in two different
assumptions: as no assumption made (The Dolev-Yao model) and as the user’s
ID is bounded to the mobile.
The main goal for analysing the protocol under this assumption is that if an
attack is discovered under the Dolev-Yao model, then we should examine if the
attack still apply under the assumption made.
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We blind message 1 from the intruder i.e. the intruder can not eavesdrop,
fake, re-ascribing or redirect message 1. We model this in Casper as follows:
#Channels
1 C NF NRA NR
6 Analysis
The outcome of the analysis shows no attack in Confidentiality and Forgery
Protection.
However, attacks were found in Not Transferable, Data Integrity and No
Multiple Cash-in properties. The main vulnerability is a simple logical attack
against the hashes of the M-coupon. The identity of the user attached to the
M-coupon can be easily extracted and changed to any identity. If we consider
the M-coupon, the identity ID(u) is not attached correctly to the M-coupon.
Anyone is able to compute the first two parts, ID(u) and V to get h[ID(i)]:
h[ID(i)] = ID(u)⊕ V
By obtaining h[ID(i)], the intruder is able to attach any identity, such as
ID(intruder) without changing the third part C, and thus produce a new coupon
M ′:
V ′ = ID(intruder)⊕ h[ID(i)]
M ′ = ID(intruder) , V ′ , C
Even though this analysis was under the Dolev-Yao threat model, the prop-
erties are still broken under the assumption of a bounded user ID. The attacker
still could change the user identity in an eavesdropped M-coupon to his own
identity, and cash it in with the cashier. The intruder could even know the user
ID by pretending to be an issuer.
As far as the analysis is concerned, the Unauthorized Copying property can
be divided into two properties: Not Transferable and User Authentication. Not
Transferable is an agreement between the issuer and the cashier that whatever
user identity presented at issuing phase, it shall not be changed during the
protocol. Whereas, User authentication is stronger in that, in addition to Not
transferable, the identity of the user is the one who it claim to be. I.e. an agree-
ment between the user and the cashier. This protocol only tries to address Not
transferable requirement, which may be sufficient in the case of their assumption
or in a secure and trusted issuing phase.
7 Suggested solution
We suggest three solutions to address the found vulnerability: An enhanced hash-
based protocol which is a solution based on the assumption of the bounded ID
12
Table 1. Hash based protocol and provided solutions against in-
tended/addressed/failed requirements
Hash-based Enhanced Hash-based Footfall Premium
Confidentiality
√ √ √ √
Forgery Protection
√ √ √ √
Data Integrity x
√ √ √
No Multiple Cash in x
√ √ √
Not Transferable x
√ √
User Authentication
√
assumption. In addition, We provide two kinds of marketing-oriented M-coupon
protocols, the footfall M-coupon protocol and the premium M-coupon protocol,
both of which are based on the Dolev-Yao model. Table 1 summarises solutions
provided with addressed properties.
7.1 Enhanced hash-based protocol
In order to address the broken properties ( Not Transferable, Data Integrity and
No Multiple Cash-in) in the original hash-based protocol, the identity of the user
must be attached correctly to the coupon. This solution must be only considered
in a secure and trusted issuing phase. The change needed is replacing C part in
Figure ?? to become:
C = h[h[ID(i)], X,Offer, ID(u)]
As far as the Not Transferable property is concerned, it is only useful within
a trusted issuing phase which is not always the case. The fact that user ID can
be faked by anyone makes combining the User Authentication property with Not
Transferable property more useful and meaningful. So, the best choice would be
to use them all, the premium protocol, or drop them all, the footfall protocol.
7.2 marketing-oriented protocols solutions
The footfall M-coupon protocol is used when the main purpose of the M-coupon
is to increase the number of people visiting the shop, regardless of whom is
using it. Whereas, the premium M-coupon protocol used when the client has
paid for it, and only the intended user is allowed to cash it. The premium M-
coupon protocol addresses all requirements discussed in section 3. The footfall
M-coupon protocol addresses the same requirements, except Not Transferable
and User Authentication.
The footfall M-coupon protocol Figure 5a shows the footfall M-coupon
protocol.
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Issuer User's Mobile Cashier
M-coupon
BONUS
M-coupon
2
3
4
M-coupon =
 h[ ID(i) , X , Offer ,Nu ] ,  
Nu, h[ ID(i) ] 
   
Nu 1
(a) the footfall M-coupon protocol
Issuer User's Mobile Cashier
M-coupon
BONUS
2
3
4
M-coupon =
 h[ ID(i) , X , Offer , h[ ID(u) ] ] 
 h[ ID(i) ] 
   
h[ ID(u) ] 1
Nc, ID(c)
5
M-coupon , ID(u)
 h[ Nc, X2,  ID(c), ID(u) ]
   
(b) the premium M-coupon protocol
Fig. 5. Suggested Solution
Footfall/Premium Protocols notations:
ID(i) = Issuer ID.
ID(u) = User ID.
ID(c) = Cashier ID.
Offer = Data about the Offer .
X = A secret key between the issuer and the cashier .
X2 = A secret key between the user and the cashier .
Nu = User’s nonce (random number).
Nc = Cashier’s nonce.
h[ ] = Hash function.
There are four messages in this protocol:
1. U → I : Nu
2. I → U : M-coupon = h[ID(i), X , Offer ,Nu ] , Nu,h[ID(i)]
3. U → C: M-coupon = h[ID(i) , X , Offer ,Nu ] , Nu,h[ID(i)]
4. C → U : BONUS
After the user brings his mobile close to the issuer, his mobile sends a ran-
dom number Nu (message 1). Then, the Issuer sends the M-coupon to the user
(message 2). The M-coupon contains a hash of the issuer identity, the secret key
X, the promised offer and user random number. In addition, a hash of the issuer
identity, with the user’s random number. Then, the user brings his mobile near
the cashier and sends the M-coupon (message 3). From the hashes’ table of is-
suers’ identities, the cashier uses h[ID(i)] to find the corresponding ID(i), secret
X and the offer. The cashier can check the validity of the M-coupon. Through
the nonce Nu the cashier can manage the M-coupon that every issued M-coupon
has a unique random number. The cashier can, for example, stop using the M-
coupon after five uses. Finally, if all these conditions are satisfied, then bonus is
given to the user (message 4).
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Confidentiality, Data Integrity and Forgery Protection requirements are en-
sured by use of the secret value X and offer. Multiple Cash-in can be managed
by including the nonce. However, a stronger Multiple Cash-in is provided in the
premium M-coupon protocol.
Confidentiality-Footfall: StrongSecret(C,x,offer,[I])
Forgery Protection-Footfall: NonIAgreement(I,C,[x,offer,nu]
Data Integrity-Footfall: NonIAgreement(I,C,[x,offer,nu,I])
No Multiple Cash-in -Footfall: Agreement(I,C,[x,offer,nu])
The premium M-coupon protocol The main enhancement in this protocol
is attaching an authentic user identity to the coupon. I.e. addressing Not Trans-
ferable and User Authentication. Figure 5b illustrates the premium M-coupon
protocol.
1. U → I : h[ID(u)]
2. I → U : M-coupon
3. C → U : Nc , ID(c)
4. U → C : M-coupon , ID(u) , h[Nc , X2 , ID(c) , ID(u)]
5. C → U : BONUS
M-coupon = h[ID(i) , X , Offer , h[ID(u)] ] , h[ID(i)]
The user’s mobile sends a hash of his identity ID(u) to the issuer (message
1). Then, the Issuer sends the M-coupon to the user (message 2). The M-coupon
contains a hash of: the issuer identity, the secret X, the offer, the hashed user’s
identity. In addition, a hash of the issuer identity. At cashing phase, the cashier
sends his identity and a nonce Nc (message 3). At message 4, the user sends the
M-coupon and the user identity, with a new hash contains: Nc, the secret value
X2, the cashier identity and the user identity.
The cashier can send the bonus based on verifying the two hashes in message
4. From the hashes’ table of issuers’ identities, the cashier uses h[ID(i)] to find
the corresponding ID(i), secret X and the offer, with user identity known from
message 4, the cashier can check the validity of the M-coupon. The second hash
which authenticates the user, the cashier uses ID(u) to find the corresponding
secret X2, and combines it with already known data (Nc, ID(c), ID(u)) to check
the validity of the second hash. The cashier can link the M-coupon hash with
the second one by checking that both of them include the same identity ID(u).
Confidentiality-Premium: StrongSecret(C,x,offer,x2,[I])
Forgery Protection-Premium: NonIAgreement(I,C,[x,offer]
Data Integrity-Premium: NonIAgreement(I,C,[x,offer,I,U])
No Multiple Cash-in-Premium: Agreement(I,C,[x,offer,U])
Not transfarable-Premium: NonIAgreement(I,C,[U])
User Authentecation-Premium: Agreement(U,C,[nc,x2,U])
We formally verify the security of these solutions: the Casper/FDR2 analysis
found no attacks.
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8 Conclusion
We used formal methods, Casper/FDR2, to examine a hash based M-coupon
protocol and check whether it meets its requirements. The outcome of the anal-
ysis shows a simple logical attack in the hashes combination of the M-coupon,
which damages many of protocol’s requirements. Solutions were provided based
on two assumptions: when the issuing phase is trusted where the intruder is
more restricted; and where the intruder has the power to claim any identity.
This paper can be considered as a case study of how a black-box analysis can
provide powerful results about NFC protocols.
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